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Casenote

DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno: The Supreme
Court Hits the Brakes on Determining the
Constitutionality of Investment Incentives
Given by States to Corporate America

I.

INTRODUCTION

In DaimlerChryslerCorp. v. Cuno,' the United States Supreme Court,
under the pen of Chief Justice Roberts, unanimously held that state
taxpayers did not have Article III standing to challenge local property
tax abatements and investment tax credits given to DaimlerChrysler
Corporation ("Daimler").2 Claiming standing as municipal and state
taxpayers, the plaintiffs challenged the City of Toledo and the State of
Ohio's decisions to offer Daimler certain exemptions from and reductions
of its local property and state franchise taxes.' The Court held that the
plaintiffs failed to satisfy the injury-in-fact and redressability requirements of standing because their alleged injury was too "'conjectural or
hypothetical."' 4 As a result, the Court never reached the merits of the

1. 126 S. Ct. 1854 (2006).
2. Id. at 1859.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1862-63.
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case where the plaintiffs had claimed that the tax breaks violated the
dormant, or negative, Commerce Clause.5 Therefore, whether state tax
incentives to corporations violate the dormant Commerce Clause is a
question that will remain unanswered for now. This note (1) considers
the broader implications of the Court's refusal to reach the merits of
dormant Commerce Clause analysis as it relates to states granting
investment incentives to big businesses and (2) analyzes several
scholarly options for a better dormant Commerce Clause analysis of state
tax incentives. Ironically enough, DaimlerChrysleris noteworthy for
what it did not decide.6
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In an effort to encourage the large automobile conglomerate, "Daimler," to expand its manufacturing facilities, the City of Toledo and the
State of Ohio offered Daimler local and state tax breaks for new
investment within the state.7 The Ohio Franchise Tax Credit allowed
businesses to receive credit against the state franchise tax for qualifying
investments of "new manufacturing machinery and equipment" used
within the state.8 Additionally, municipalities in Ohio have authority
to waive property taxes for businesses who invest in certain areas so
long as the local school districts consent.9 In 1998 Daimler received the
benefit of both tax breaks when it contractually agreed to expand its
Jeep assembly plant in Toledo."° Daimler's proposed investment in the
state was valued at $1.2 billion, and the conglomerate was forecasted to
provide the region with several thousand jobs." Because1 2 of the tax
break, Daimler saved approximately $280 million in taxes.

5. Id. at 1864; U.S.

CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3.
6. See generally Brandon P. Denning, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, State
Investment Incentives, and the Future of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 2006
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 173 (2006). The Supreme Court dodged the long-awaited resolution
of constitutional questions surrounding subsidies and tax incentives as they relate to the
negative Commerce Clause. However, this decision is an important milestone in the
development of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, signaling the true difficulties in
determining the Court's use of the term "'discrimination'" in deciding whether a law
contravenes interstate commerce and the policies underlying the Framers' intent to prevent
economic Balkanization.. Id. at 194.
7. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 1859 (2006).
8. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.33(B)(1) (West 2006).
9. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5709.62(D)(1) (West 2006).
10. DaimlerChrysler,126 S.Ct. at 1859.
11. Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, 386 F.3d 738, 741 (6th Cir. 2004).
12. Id.

2007]

DAIMLERCHRYSLER V. CUNO

1413.

Taxpayers in Toledo sued in state court, alleging that the tax benefits
violated the Commerce Clause. i" Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed
that the Ohio Franchise Tax Credit discriminated against interstate
economic activity by coercing businesses already subject to the franchise
tax to expand in-state rather than out-of-state. 4 The plaintiffs claimed
they had standing because the tax breaks diminished the pool of funds
available to the city and state, causing the plaintiffs to suffer a
disproportionate tax burden because the government had less revenue
and thus had to forego other expenditures.'5 These taxpayers essentially argued that they would have to make up the difference in this deficit
with future taxes. 6
While the action was pending in state court, the defendants successfully removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio. 7 The plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the case to
state court because they doubted they satisfied the constitutional
standing requirements imposed by Article III's "case or controversy"
The district court rejected the plaintiffs' motion to
limitation.' 8
remand, stating that the plaintiffs had proper standing under the
"'municipal taxpayer standing' rule" laid down in Massachusetts v.
Mellon. 9 In analyzing the merits, the district court held that neither
tax benefit violated the Commerce Clause.2 ° On appeal, the Sixth
Circuit agreed with the district court regarding the municipal property
tax exemption, but held that the state franchise tax violated the
Commerce Clause.2 ' The court of appeals, however, wholly failed to
consider whether the plaintiffs had standing.2 2 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to consider whether the Ohio Franchise Tax Credit
violated the Commerce Clause but failed to reach this issue.2"
III.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Commerce Clause-found in Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, of the
Constitution-is an affirmative grant of power to Congress "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 3.
Cuno, 386 F.3d at 743.
DaimlerChrysler,126 S. Ct. at 1862.
Id. at 1862-63.
Id. at 1860.
Id.; U.S. CONST. art. III.
DaimlerChrysler,126 S. Ct. at 1860; 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923).
DaimlerChrysler,126 S. Ct. at 1860; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
DaimlerChrysler,126 S. Ct. at 1860; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 3.
DaimlerChrysler 126 S. Ct. at 1860.
Id.
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the Indian Tribes." 24 Since the United States' early beginnings as an
independent nation, the government has sought to prevent states from
waging economic war on one another.2" To help deter states from using
protectionist measures against one another, the Supreme Court
interpreted, and continues to interpret, the Commerce Clause such that
states cannot discriminate or unduly burden interstate commerce "'to
benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.'"2" In applying the dormant Commerce Clause to investment
incentives given by states to big businesses, the Court has caused
incredible confusion both in the scholarly and judicial world.17 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has used the dormant Commerce Clause to
invalidate two basic areas of state tax law: (1) taxes-mostly transactional taxes-that act like tariffs, and (2) taxes that penalize in-state
businesses for engaging in out-of-state activities.2"
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause As Applied to Taxes and
Subsidies: The Doctrine's Moorings
The dormant Commerce Clause, as applied to taxes and subsidies, has
been developed and refined over many years. In Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Brady,29 the Supreme Court outlined its most celebrated test for
determining the constitutionality of state tax laws under the dormant
Commerce Clause. 0 In applying the Complete Auto test, a state tax
provision satisfies the dormant Commerce Clause so long as (1) a
substantial nexus exists between the taxing state and the taxed activity;
(2) the tax is fairly apportioned to income; (3) the tax does not discriminate against interstate commerce;
and (4) the tax is fairly related to the
31
benefits the state provides.
In Complete Auto the State of Mississippi assessed a sales tax against
a Michigan corporation engaged in the business of transporting

24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
25. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 224 (1824).
26. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 192 (1994) (quoting New Energy
Co. Of Ind. V. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988)); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S.
322, 326 (1979); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 534-35 (1949).
27. See generally Edward A. Zelinsky, Restoring Politics to the Commerce Clause: The
Case for Abandoning the Dormant Commerce Clause Prohibition on Discriminatory
Taxation, 29 OHio N.U. L. REV. 29 (2002) (observing that legal scholars in this area have
labored extraordinarily hard to try to find workable rules).
28. See Philip M. Tatarowicz & Rebecca F. Mims-Velarde, An Analytical Approach to
State Tax DiscriminationUnder the Commerce Clause, 39 VAND. L. REV. 879 (1986).

29. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
30. Id. at 279.
31. Id.
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automobiles to Mississippi dealers.3 2 The Michigan corporation argued
that its operations were part of a large interstate movement and that
the sales tax as applied to the interstate movement violated the dormant
Commerce Clause.33
The Supreme Court held that because the
corporation failed to allege that the tax lacked a substantial nexus, that
the tax discriminated against interstate commerce, or that the tax was
unrelated to the services provided by the state, it was not per se
unconstitutional.3 4 Instead of arguing the absence or presence of any
of the four factors-substantial nexus, discrimination, fair apportionment, or that the tax is fairly related to the services provided by the
state-the Michigan corporation relied solely on Supreme Court
decisions that held that "a tax on the 'privilege' of engaging in an
activity in the State may not be applied to an activity that is part of
interstate commerce."3" The antidiscrimination principle stated in
Complete Auto has been the most important principle in the development
of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence because
courts have had the
35
hardest time developing, defining, and refining it.
B. Development of the AntidiscriminationPrinciple-SomeProblems
Along the Way
Courts have had a tough time developing the antidiscrimination
principle because it lacks mutuality in application when comparing taxes
with subsidies. To help illustrate some of the problems that the
Supreme Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence-as applied
to state tax laws-has caused, consider the holding in New Energy Co.
of Indiana v. Limbach.3 7
In New Energy an Ohio statute awarded a tax credit against its motor
vehicle fuel sales tax for each gallon of ethanol sold by fuel dealers.
However, the credit only applied if the ethanol was produced in the state
or, if it was produced in another state, the credit applied only to the
extent that the other state granted similar tax credits to companies who
produce ethanol in Ohio.38 Under the law, New Energy Company

32. Id. at 275-76.
33. Id. at 277.
34. Id. at 287-89.
35. Id. at 278.
36. See generally Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce
Clause Constraintson State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377,426 (1996).
37. 486 U.S. 269 (1988).
38. Id. at 271. Ethanol or ethyl alcohol is made from corn and used as an automotive
fuel. Id. It is mixed with gasoline in a ratio of one to nine to produce what is called
gasohol. Id. In recent years, due to rising gas prices and fluctuations in the petroleum
market, ethanol has become a widely produced form of fuel. Id.
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benefited from Ohio's tax credit for the ethanol it produced in Indiana
because Indiana granted Ohio producers of ethanol similar tax credits.
Indiana, however, subsequently repealed its tax credit and replaced it
with a direct subsidy to Indiana ethanol producers, making New Energy
Company ineligible for Ohio's tax credit.3 9 New Energy argued that the
tax credit violated the dormant Commerce Clause because it discriminated against out-of-state ethanol producers to the advantage of in-state
producers by favoring the latter in granting tax breaks.4 °
The Supreme Court held that because the Ohio tax credit violated the
dormant Commerce Clause's cardinal rule of nondiscrimination, it was
unconstitutional.'
The Court did note, however, that New Energy
Company received a direct subsidy from Indiana, which was potentially
no less discriminatory than the Ohio tax credit.42 The Court further
stated in dicta that direct subsidization does not run afoul of the
dormant Commerce Clause but that discriminatory taxation of out-ofstate manufacturers does.43 Therefore, because Indiana converted its
prior discriminatory tax scheme into a direct expenditure program, its
effect seemingly became innocuous under dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, whereas Ohio's tax credit violated the dormant Commerce
Clause because it ran afoul of the antidiscrimination principle. 44
C. Taxes that Act Like Tariffs
The area in which the Court has invalidated most state statutes is
where the state tax operates like a tariff. As an illustration of the
Court's interpretation of the dormant Commerce Clause's applicability
to state tax incentives, consider Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax
Commission.4 5
In Boston Stock Exchange stock exchanges located outside of New York
brought a lawsuit to challenge an amendment to a New York statute
that imposed a transfer tax on securities transactions.46 In effect, the
transfer tax statute taxed out-of-state transactions more heavily than

39. Id. at 272-73. A subsidy, in economic terms, is a direct monetary payment given
by the government to lower the prices faced by a consumer or producer. In its economic
effect, a subsidy operates just like a negative tax. HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 293
(6th ed. 2002).
40. New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 273.
41. Id. at 274.
42. Id. at 278.
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
46. Id. at 319.
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most in-state transactions.4 7 The purpose of the amendment was
clearly protectionist."
The Court stated that the purpose of the
dormant Commerce Clause was to create one economic unit.49 But the
Court noted its own deficiencies in dormant Commerce Clause analysis,
stating that "[the] case-by-case approach [of our dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence] has left 'much room for controversy and confusion
and little in the way of precise guides to the States in the exercise of
their indispensable power of taxation.'"5'
Despite the inconsistencies,
controversies, and confusion, the Court further stated that "[n]o State,
consistent with the Commerce Clause, may 'impose a tax which
discriminates against interstate commerce ... by providing a direct
commercial advantage to local business.'"'" Although the Court held
the New York transfer tax unconstitutional, 2 the Court expressly
stated that its decision did not prevent states from structuring their tax
53
systems to encourage the growth of intrastate commerce and industry.
But more importantly, the Court finally realized and declared that its
own dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence was a "'quagmire.'"5 4
D. Taxes that Benefit In-State Businesses but Also Penalize Those
Businesses for Out-'of-State Investment
The other circumstance in which the Court has generally applied the
antidiscrimination principle is where a state imposes a tax that benefits
in-state business if it continues to invest and grow within the state, but
penalizes the same business if it decides to invest outside the state. In
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully,55 the Supreme Court held that a
New York franchise tax violated the dormant Commerce Clause's
antidiscrimination principle because it allowed parent corporations to
receive a greater tax credit as their subsidiaries moved a greater
percentage of their shipping activities into New York.5" In effect, the
New York tax created a positive incentive for parent companies to
increase their subsidiary's shipping activities in the State of New York,
but penalized Domestic International Sales Corporations ("DISC") for

47. Id.
48. See id. at 326-28.
49. See id. at 328.
50. Id. at 329 (quoting Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358
U.S. 450, 457 (1959)).
51. Id. (quoting Northwestern, 358 U.S. at 457) (omission in original).
52. Id. at 337.
53. Id. at 336.
54. Id. at 329 (quoting Northwestern, 358 U.S. at 458).
55. 466 U.S. 388 (1984).
56. Id. at 400-01, 407.
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increasing their shipping activities outside of New York.57 The New
York Tax Commission argued that the tax credit was not designed to
increase the flow of shipping activities to New York, but to prevent
existing DISC from moving shipping activities out of New York.58
The Court held that it did not matter whether the tax was designed
to increase new shipping activities in New York or to prevent the
existing DISC from moving their subsidiaries' shipping activities out of
New York, stating that under either purpose it is a discriminatory tax
that "'forecloses tax-neutral decisions and ... creates ... an advantage'
for firms operating in New York by placing a 'discriminatory burden on
commerce to its sister States."59 The Court further noted that the New
York tax violated the antidiscrimination principle because it encouraged
business operations that could be performed more efficiently in other
states to be performed in-state.' Therefore, whenever a tax incentive
encourages in-state business activity at the expense of out-of-state
business activity, thereby creating a discriminatory economic impact, it
is unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause.6 '
2
In Camps Newfound/ Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison,"
the
Supreme Court held that a Maine property tax exemption limited to
charitable organizations incorporated in Maine violated the dormant
Commerce Clause."
The petitioner, a Maine nonprofit organization,
operated a church camp for children, most of whom were nonresidents. 64 The statute at issue did not allow as large of an exemption for
institutions whose primary clientele were nonresidents.65 Therefore,
because the petitioner provided services mostly for out-of-state clients,
it was taxed more heavily than other camp operators who primarily
served in-state clients.66
The Court observed that "[a]s a practical matter, the statute encourages affected entities to limit their out-of-state clientele, and penalizes the
principally nonresident customers of businesses catering to a primarily
interstate market."67 The Court held that the statute was discriminatory on its face and applied the "virtually per se invalid" standard as

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 400-01.
Id. at 405-06.
Id. (citing Boston Stock Exchange, 429 U.S. at 331) (omissions in original).
Id. (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970)).
See id. at 406-07.
520 U.S. 564 (1997).
Id. at 572.
Id. at 567.
Id. at 568.
Id. at 576.
Id.
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opposed to "Pike balancing,"8 a standard that is usually applied when
the statute treats in-state and out-of-state residents the same.6" More
important to this Article, the Town of Harrison argued that its tax
exemption constituted a legally discriminatory subsidy.70 The Court
responded, "We find these arguments unpersuasive. Although tax
exemptions and subsidies serve similar ends, they differ in important
and relevant respects .. .."7 Although the Court declared that there
is a difference between tax exemptions and subsidies, they have failed
to identify such a distinction, leaving lower courts and states at sea.
E.

The ConstitutionalHurdle: Article III Standing

Before reaching constitutional questions, such as dormant Commerce
Clause questions, the Court requires a plaintiff to have standing to
prosecute his claim. Article III, Section 2, of the United States
Constitution provides that "judicial Power shall extend" to certain
enumerated categories of "Cases" and "Controversies."72 Regarding the
inherent limits of Article III, Section 2, a party must have standing to
prosecute actions in federal court.73
Standing has two essential components: "[(1)] Article III standing,
which enforces the Constitution's case or controversy requirement; and
[(2)] prudential standing, which embodies 'judicially self-imposed limits
on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.'" 74
Generally, Article III
standing requires (1) injury-in-fact; (2) causation; and (3) redressability.75 For taxpayers to satisfy the injury-in-fact element of standing,
they must show that they have suffered a particularized and concrete
injury distinct from that suffered by the general public. 78 This same
principle applies with equal force to state taxpayers.77

68. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. Pike Balancing is a mid-level scrutiny level the Court applies
when the statute regulates in-state and out-of-state participants even-handedly. Id.
Where the state can show a legitimate local interest and that the effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, the statute will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
interstate commerce is "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Id.
69. Id.; Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 520 U.S. at 581.
70. Camps Newfound /Owatonna, Inc., 520 U.S. at 588-89.
71. Id. at 589.
72. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
73. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004).
74. Id. (citations omitted).
75. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
76. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
77. Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952).
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In Frothingham v. Mellon, decided with Massachusetts v. Mellon,78
the plaintiff sued, challenging the constitutionality of a federal statute
designed to "reduce maternal and infant mortality and protect the health
of mothers and infants."79 The plaintiff alleged that because the effect
of the statute would increase her future tax burden, it constituted a
taking of her property without due process of law.8" The Supreme
Court held that the federal taxpayer's interest in the moneys of the
treasury is shared with every other taxpayer, thereby making it
"comparatively minute and indeterminable, and the effect upon future
taxation, of any payment out of the funds, so remote, fluctuating and
uncertain," that there can be no standing.8 '
The only exception to the Article III standing requirement was laid
down in Flast v. Cohen, 2 where the Court held that "a taxpayer will
have standing consistent with Article III to invoke federal judicial power
when he alleges that congressional action under the taxing and spending
clause is in derogation of [the Establishment Clause]."83 In Flast the
plaintiffs challenged an education act that funneled tax revenues to
religious institutions for education in reading, arithmetic, and other
subjects.84 As such, the expenditures violated the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment,8 5 which specifically
limits Congress's taxing and spending powers conferred by Article I,
Section 8, of the Constitution.8 6 Therefore, the taxpayers had standing
to prosecute their claim in federal court.8
Nonetheless, this case
reinforced the principle that before a court will reach the constitutional
issues of a case, it must establish that the parties have sufficient
standing to enter the federal domain.8
IV.

COURT'S RATIONALE

In DaimlerChryslerCorp. v. Cuno,89 the Court did not reach the issue
of whether Ohio's Franchise Tax Credit90 violated the dormant Com-

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

262 U.S. 447 (1923).
Id. at 479.
Id. at 486.
Id. at 487.
392 U.S. 83 (1968).
Id. at 105-06; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Flast, 392 U.S. at 85-86.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Flast, 392 U.S. at 105.
Id. at 88.
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 1859 (2006).
126 S. Ct. 1854 (2006).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.33(B)(1) (West 2006).
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merce Clause because it determined the plaintiffs did not have standing
to prosecute their claim in federal court.9 Chief Justice Roberts began
the majority's opinion by discussing the case or controversy requirement
of Article

111,92

noting its importance in maintaining the "'tripartite

allocation of power' set forth in the Constitution."9" As to the plaintiffs'
assertion that the franchise tax depleted the available funds in the
treasury, thereby increasing their tax burdens, the Court held that such
injury was not "'concrete and particularized,' but instead a grievance the
taxpayer 'suffers in some indefinite way in common with people
generally. ' Specifically, the Court noted that it is unclear whether
the Ohio tax credit actually depleted the treasury; the general purpose
of a tax break is to stimulate economic growth, which in turn supposedly
fills the public coffers.9" For the plaintiffs to show injury, they have to
speculate that government officials will increase their tax burden to
make up for the alleged deficit arising out of the tax credit; to establish
redressability, the plaintiffs must speculate that the officials will reduce
their tax burden by the increase in revenue if Daimler pays the
franchise tax.9" According to the Court, it is this 97
type of speculation
the Article III standing limitations seek to prevent.
Furthermore, the Court held that the same logic and precedent that
has denied federal taxpayer standing in these types of cases applied with
equal force to state taxpayers.9" Regarding the plaintiffs' attempt to
invoke the exception laid down in Flast v. Cohen,99 the Court held that
if the Flast exception were extended to include the dormant Commerce

91. DaimlerChrysler,126 S. Ct. at 1859.
92. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
93. DaimlerChrysler,126 S. Ct. at 1861.
94. Id. at 1862 (citations omitted).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1862-63 (citing ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 614 (1989)).
Essentially, there was no true way to know whether the tax credit increased or diminished
the plaintiffs' tax burdens. See id. It is common expansionary fiscal policy to decrease
taxes to increase economic growth. Id. at 1862-63. Additionally, there is no principled way
of knowing that the legislature will take the increased moneys from the franchise tax and
reduce the taxpayer's burdens. Id. at 1863. The Court noted that any decision to allocate
the savings from the franchise tax to a reduction in taxpayer's burden is within the
discretionary power of the legislature. Id. The Court further noted that because state
budgets oftentimes have many provisions for spending and taxes, allowing a taxpayer
standing merely because they pay taxes would give the courts power to continually monitor
states' fiscal decisions. Id. at 1864.
97. See id. at 1862-64.
98. Id. at 1863 (citing Doremus v. Bd.of Educ. of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429,434 (1952)).
The Court has likened state taxpayers to federal taxpayers for standing purposes.
99. 392 U.S. 83, 105-06 (1968).
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Clause, there would be no way of distinguishing other constitutional
provisions that limit governments' taxing and spending decisions. °0
In short, federal courts would become subject to suits for taxpayers'
"generalized grievances. " 1° 1
In their last attempt to prove standing, the plaintiffs argued that their
status as municipal taxpayers gave them standing to challenge the
franchise tax.1 °2 First, the plaintiffs argued that because the law
required revenues from the franchise tax to be distributed to municipalities, the award of the credit to Daimler depleted the funds of their
municipality.'l 3 Second, the plaintiffs relied on United Mine Workers
v. Gibbs' to argue that supplemental jurisdiction extended to all of
their claims once the district court determined that they had standing
on the property tax exemption claim.' 5
In rejecting the first theory, the Court held that the plaintiffs'
challenge was nonetheless a challenge to a state law and a state
decision, and that by arguing from the standpoint of a municipal
taxpayer, the plaintiffs' argument for injury became more attenuated.'0 6 In rejecting the second theory, the Court held that the plaintiffs'
reading of Gibbs would destroy the doctrines of mootness, ripeness, and
political question, and therefore, the plaintiffs' interpretation of Gibbs
was incorrect and misguided.' 7 Due to the plaintiffs' failure to prove
Article III standing, the Supreme Court vacated the lower court's ruling
in part and remanded the case for dismissal of the plaintiffs' challenge
to the state franchise tax. 0 8

100.

DaimlerChrysler,126 S. Ct. at 1865.

101. Id. (quoting Flast,392 U.S. at 106).
102.

Id.

103. Id. at 1866. The plaintiffs tried to claim standing under the "municipal taxpayer
standing rule" recognized in Frothingham,which allows municipal residents "to enjoin the
illegal use of moneys of a municipal corporation." 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923).
104. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). Gibbs was the seminal case in establishing supplemental
jurisdiction, which is now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000).
105. DaimlerChrysler,126 S.Ct. at 1866.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1867. The Court noted that it had never used Gibbs to allow a federal court
to authorize supplemental jurisdiction over a claim that itself fails to satisfy constitutional
standing. Id. The plaintiffs read Gibbs to mean that "federal jurisdiction extends to all
claims sufficiently related to a claim within Article III to be part of the same case,
regardless of the nature of the deficiency that would keep the former claims out of federal
court if presented on their own." Id. at 1866.
108. Id. at 1868.
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A. Justice Ginsburg's Concurrence (concurringin part and concurring in the judgment)
Justice Ginsburg wrote a brief concurring opinion to expressly note her
agreement with the "nonjusticiability of Frothingham-typefederal and
state taxpayer suits,"10 9 but to also note her reservations with the
limitations on standing set forth in a number of cases, such as Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
& State, Inc."0 and Allen v. Wright,"' in which
dissenting opinions
12
argued that the parties had sufficient standing.
V.

IMPLICATIONS

Throughout history, state governments have utilized every weapon in
their economic arsenals to encourage businesses to invest and grow
within their respective states.13 As a result, the Court developed the
dormant Commerce Clause to mitigate the protectionist measures that
naturally flowed from this type of competition." 4 Some of states'
economic weapons include tax abatements, tax credits, below-market
leases, loan forgiveness, land giveaways, and direct outlays in the form
of subsidies." 5 The most common weapon is the one Ohio gave to
Daimler: a credit against its taxes. 1 6 Although the Court did not
reach the constitutional issue in DaimlerChryslerCorp. v. Cuno,"7 the
case is still important to dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence
because it left an important issue unresolved. As a result, scholarly
debate on the constitutionality of state tax incentives has blossomed. In
effect, the Supreme Court merely postponed a decision that scholars
have long awaited and that will eventually have to be made."' As the

109. Id. at 1869 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
110. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
111. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
112. DaimlerChrysler,126 S. Ct. at 1869 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see Allen, 468 U.S.
at 766-83 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Allen, 468 U.S. at 783-95 (Stevens and Blackmun, JJ.,
dissenting); Valley Forge ChristianCollege, 454 U.S. at 490-513 (Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun, JJ., dissenting); Valley Forge ChristianCollege, 454 U.S. at 513-15 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
113. Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State
Business Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 789, 790, 857, 860 (1996).
114. See id. at 790-92.
115. Id. at 790, 855.
116. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.33(B)(1) (West 2006); Hellerstein & Coenen, supra
note 113, at 817.
117. 126 S. Ct. 1854.
118. Denning, supra note 6, at 173.
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case law above indicates, the Court's dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence has left state governments with no real dividing line
between constitutional and unconstitutional investment incentives. Some
scholars argue that-these incentives create bidding wars, forcing states
into a "race to the bottom."11 9 There are, however, several different
ideas and approaches that scholars in this area have expounded upon as
solutions to the problem. 20 Again, the central issues are whether
incentive packages violate the dormant Commerce Clause, and derivatively, whether the incentives are truly helpful to the states that employ
their use.
A. Zelinsky: Throw the Anti-DiscriminationPrincipleIn the
Garbage or Give it Teeth
Edward Zelinsky argues that because there is no principled way of
distinguishing between a discriminatory and a nondiscriminatory tax,
and because the tax versus subsidy distinction recognized by the Court
does not fully account for the dormant Commerce Clause's declared
purpose of ridding. the Union of economic Balkanization, the Supreme
Court should either "jettison" the antidiscrimination principle or extend
it to include direct outlays.' 2 ' Because a direct outlay, such as a
subsidy, has exactly the same impact as a negative tax,'22 Ohio could
simply restructure its Investment Tax Credit as a direct expenditure
program" z and avoid running afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause
like the Indiana company in New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach.'24
Thus, the tax/subsidy distinction is unworkable.'25 Zelinsky, on the
other hand, would preserve the other three elements from Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady26 and would retain the nondiscrimination

119. Enrich, supra note 36, at 380.
120. See generally Enrich, supra note 36; Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 107 YALE L.J. 965 (1998); Denning, supra note 6, at 192;
Zelinsky, supra note 27; Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 113.
121. See Zelinsky, supra note 27, at 79-80. Economic Balkanization is a term that has
been used to highlight the constitutional framers' fear of high trade barriers that generally
prevent the free flow of commerce among the states. See H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v.
DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 554 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting). Economic Balkanization is often
considered one of the main factors that caused problems with the Colonies and the Articles
of Confederation. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979).
122. ROSEN, supra note 39, at 293.
123. See Zelinsky, supra note 27, at 46.
124. 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988).
125. See Zelinsky, supra note 27, at 46.
126. 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
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principle 7for dormant Commerce Clause analysis outside of the tax
context. 12
B.

Coenen & Hellerstein: It's Time for Change
Professor Coenen and Professor Hellerstein also recognize
the issue
facing the Supreme Court in cases like DaimlerChrysler.That is, "how
is a constitutionally benign incentive designed to attract industry to a
state to be distinguished from an unconstitutionally discriminatory
incentive designed to do the same thing?" 12s The dilemma in the
Court's case law is that the antidiscrimination principle allows subsidies
issued from the general revenues to survive constitutional challenge, but
disallows tax programs that have the same effect and purpose."2 The
true problem lies in the Court's internal consistency doctrine, which
looks only to the structure of the incentive to see whether mass
application of the incentive by all of the states in the Union would
disadvantage interstate commerce, not at the economic reality of the
incentive.130
These two professors propose a new test. First, the tax incentive must
favor in-state activity over out-of-state activity; and second, the incentive
must implicate the coercive power of the state.'' Both elements of the
constitutional inquiry must be violated before a court could declare the
tax incentive unconstitutional. 3 2 This test has an exception: if the
state is not exempting or reducing a business's existing tax liability, but
is merely reducing additional tax liability that the business would incur
if it engaged in the targeted activity within the state, the incentive
should survive constitutional challenge.'33
Therefore, for the tax
incentive in DaimlerChryslerto survive constitutional challenge under
this test, Daimler would have to either (1) engage in a new targeted
activity/industry, which would cause it additional tax liability, or (2) not
have been doing business in Ohio in the first place.
C.

Enrich: Save the AntidiscriminationPrinciple

Professor Enrich, the attorney for the plaintiffs in DaimlerChrysler,
strongly believes in the antidiscrimination principle."M He explains,

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

See Zelinsky, supra note 27, at 46.
Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 113, at 791.
See New Energy, 486 U.S. at 278; Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 113, at 791.
Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 113, at 807-08.
Id. at 806.
Id.
Id. at 806-07.
Enrich, supra note 36, at 426.
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"[Tihe primary focus in determining whether a particular tax provision
runs afoul of the antidiscrimination principle is a practically oriented
analysis of the provision's purposes and effects."' 35
Noting the
inherent defects in the Court's dormant Commerce Clause case law,13
Enrich argues that the Court should revamp the antidiscrimination
principle to focus on "whether a particular tax provision distorts
economic decisionmaking in favor of in-state activity, not whether it
treats in-state and out-of-state actors disparately."13 7 Under Enrich's
revamped discrimination analysis, "business location incentives would
be virtually per se unconstitutional."1 3 Arguing against some scholars
who say that the real purpose behind the dormant Commerce Clause is
political union and the prevention of interstate friction, Enrich believes
the central purpose behind the dormant Commerce Clause is to prevent
states from impeding the free flow of the national economy-that is, free
trade. 3 9 Enrich argues that by shifting the focus to an incentive's
distortions on economic decision making, the "functional similarities
between . .. [Investment Tax Credits] and property tax abatements
become0 more prominent, and their formal differences fade in im14
port."
D. When Do the Costs Outweigh the Benefits-New Jobs and
Investment v. Revenue Reduction
An important question that seems to be ignored is whether state tax
incentives actually produce the results they are intended to produce.'
In other words, does the job growth and the postulated increase in
revenue outweigh the cost of the incentive program?14 2 If the answer
is no, then state tax incentives do create a "race to the bottom" because
governments are involved in a competitive bidding war in which states
1 43
suffer greater economic ramifications as competition increases.
Specifically, the opponents of Economic Development Incentives ("EDI")
suggest that with increased competition among states for corporate
investment, states have to give such an enormous tax incentive that they

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

432.
449-53.
456.
458.
453.
457.

141. Sherry L. Jarrell et al., Law and Economics of RegulatingEconomic Development
Incentives, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 805, 822-24 (2006).
142.
143.

Id. at 822.
Id. at 809, 834.
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never fully recover their so-called investment, resulting in net losses. 144
Yet, if granting tax incentives stimulates the local economy145 and
increases revenue, it makes logical sense to allow the incentives.
The surprising thing is that states have not measured the impact that
EDI has on their local economies, and studies that have been conducted
tend to show that EDI has a "statistically significant negative impact on
economic growth of a region at the extremes-very high taxes or very
low taxes." 46
Nonetheless, most results from these studies are
147
unhelpful because it is hard to find the exact variables to measure.
Even with uncertainty about the true economic impact of EDI, fortyseven of forty-eight states that Meyer and Hassig surveyed between 1991
and 1993 adopted at least one tax incentive to encourage business to
invest and grow within their respective states. 1' Without knowledge
of the true economic impact that EDI has on state economies, it is
difficult to gauge whether incentive packages are worth the resulting
revenue reductions they cause.
Furthermore, as the holding in New Energy149 suggests, there is no
principled way of distinguishing a discriminatory tax from a discriminatory subsidy, yet the Court allows subsidies to exist without intervention. 5 ° The Court's reasoning in maintaining the tax/subsidy distinction presents an inherent flaw in its analysis-either showing its
misunderstanding of public sector economics, which is highly unlikely,
or a desire to keep dormant Commerce Clause analysis out of the
subsidy arena-because in reality, a subsidy is simply a negative tax,
and a state's discriminatory purpose can hide behind both.'5 ' Jettisoning the antidiscrimination principle, as Professor Zelinsky suggests,
completely removes the issue from the judiciary and places discriminatory taxes within the sole responsibility of a highly partisan legislature,
which, even armed with the economic knowledge that EDI is bad for

144. See generally id. at 822-24, 834.
145. See generally id. at 824.
146. Id. at 822-24.
147. Clayton P. Gillette, Business Incentives,InterstateCompetition,and the Commerce
Clause, 82 MINN. L. REV. 447, 452 (1997).
148. James R. Rogers, The Effectiveness and Constitutionalityof State Tax Incentive
Policiesfor LocatingBusinesses: A Simple Game Theoretic Analysis, 53 TAX LAW. 431, 431

(2000).
149. 486 U.S. 269.
150. This generalization, of course, presumes that subsidies are funded from general
revenues. The Court has struck down subsidies that merely rebate preexisting tax
liability-that is, where tax revenues fund the subsidy instead of general revenues. See
West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 (1994).
151. Zelinsky, supra note 27, at 34-35; ROSEN, supra note 39, at 293.

1428

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

states, would unlikely react for political reasons. To put it differently,
a politician looks good when he can boast to his constituency that he
added five hundred new jobs and claim, albeit hypothetically, that he
has stimulated the local economy. Therefore, change must come so the
dormant Commerce Clause is given what it has lacked for many decades
now: mutuality in application.
At this time, Professor Coenen and Hellerstein's test seems to best
take into account the concerns of the proponents and opponents of
EDI--economic Balkanization versus allocating scarce resources
efficiently. Their test accomplishes both goals of ridding the nation of
discriminatory incentives. By focusing on the in-state versus out-of-state
favoritism rationale and the coercive power that a state exerts when
adding a tax incentive to its taxing regime, Hellerstein and Coenen's test
acts as a switchboard, discarding discriminatory incentives while
allowing those that simply say, "Come to our state and we will not
saddle you with any additional tax burdens or at least not with the same
tax burdens that we would ordinarily impose upon taxpayers engaging
in such activity. Moreover, should you refuse our invitation, nothing will
happen to your tax bill ...
12 Thus, states can continue to use their
taxing regimes to encourage local growth in new industry without
running afoul the dormant Commerce Clause. Although the Court in
DaimlerChrysleravoided the long-awaited resolution of states' power to
use their taxing regimes for alleged growth and development, there will
surely come another day when the plaintiffs make it over the constitutional hurdle of standing, forcing the Court to finally decide the issue.
Until that day, the "race to the bottom" or the "race to the top,"
whichever is the true result of tax incentives, will continue.
JONATHAN EDWARDS
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Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 113, at 809.

